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Introduction 
Australia has long been lauded as one of the few advanced economies to escape recession 
subsequent to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Credit for Australia’s uninterrupted growth 
since the GFC has been variously ascribed to its strong banking system and robust regulatory 
agencies which existed prior to the GFC as well as the Commonwealth Government stimulus 
and bank deposit guarantee schemes initiated after the onset of the crisis (see, for instance 
Wittenhall 2011; Fenna, 2013). However, Australia was also the beneficiary of a steep rise in 
demand for commodities from its largest and fourth largest trading partners (China and India, 
respectively) in the post GFC period. Indeed, Day (2011, p. 23) has conducted empirical 
analysis to show that ‘had growth in export volumes to China been commensurate with pre-
stimulus rates, Australia would have experienced three consecutive quarters of negative real 
GDP growth’. Less well recognised is the contribution of nett migration to the country – a 
comparison of the average nett migration for the seven years either side of the GFC reveals 
an increase of 169% peaking at 300 million in 2009 (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 
2014). An indication of the pervasive effect of migration on national growth is illustrated by 
the GDP per capita recording three consecutive quarters of negative growth between 
September 2008 and March 2009 (ABS, 2014). Thus, while the nation may have escaped a 
‘technical recession’ it would be incorrect to conclude that individuals have not experienced 
fiscal stress. Moreover, an aggressive fiscal stimulus program, combined with the 
introduction of a number of unfunded social programs and falling tax receipts associated with 
a sudden drop-off in commodity prices means that the federal government is now grappling 
with large deficits over the forward estimates (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015). This in 
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turn has prompted the federal government to reduce intergovernmental transfers thus placing 
stress on state and municipal budgets. 
Australia is a federation comprising six independent states (Queensland, New South Wales, 
Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia) and two Commonwealth-
controlled territories (the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory). There have 
been two failed attempts to have local government recognised in the federal constitution. As a 
result, local government remains a ‘creature of statute’ exercising a limited remit of services 
according to the delegated powers of the six states and one territory which regulate municipal 
entities (the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) – which is the seat of the Australian federal 
parliament – does not have a system of local government; Twomey, 2012). Historically, local 
government in Australia has been responsible for roads, rates (local government taxes based 
on property value) and rubbish. In more recent times the local government remit has been 
expanded to include addressing market failure (for instance, in providing aged care, childcare 
and medical services in rural locations), recreation services and development planning, as 
well as limited welfare and law and order functions. Most of the expanded remit has gone 
unfunded by higher tiers of government (Dollery, Grant and Crase, 2011). State government 
is responsible for operating inter alia schools, police and fire fighting and providing most of 
the rail infrastructure. The Commonwealth Government is responsible for public goods such 
as defence, tertiary education and social security (Drew and Dollery, 2015a). In common with 
most federalist systems, Australia is characterised by a high degree of vertical fiscal 
imbalance, with the Commonwealth collecting 81% of tax revenues, compared with just 
3.4% attributed to local government (ABS, 2014). Intergovernmental grants are therefore an 
important source of income for Australian municipalities.  
This chapter differs from others in this book by placing particular emphasis on the effect of 
regulatory constraints on municipal resilience. The polar approaches of regulators in 
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Australia’s two largest jurisdictions – New South Wales (NSW) which regulates 152 
municipalities covering a third of the nation’s population and Victoria, which regulates 79 
municipalities encompassing a quarter of the nation’s population -present the ideal institution 
milieu for such an investigation. For instance, Victorian local government is subject to central 
auditing (including a thorough system of performance monitoring and performance analysis), 
has narrowly defined roles for elected representatives (by legislation), was subject to an 
almost two-thirds reduction in the number of councils in 1994 and has no extant taxation 
limitations. By way of contrast NSW currently has no system of central auditing (and has 
only recently introduced an (inadequate) system of performance monitoring), has widely 
defined roles for elected representatives, is presently in the throes of a forced amalgamation 
program and has had a system of taxation limitations since 1977. In general, it is probably 
fair to say that (with the exception of taxation limitations) the Victorian local governments 
have been subject to heavier regulation and intervention than their NSW peers. This is neither 
good nor bad, just different – the focus of this paper is to determine whether the different 
approaches (particularly taxation limitations) manifest as different budget outcomes over the 
period of study. To facilitate our investigation of the effect of regulatory constraints on 
municipal resilience we draw on two case studies from each of the jurisdictions. One council 
from each jurisdiction has been selected from two polar budgetary positions – councils with 
low volatility negative budget outcomes and councils with highly volatile positive budgetary 
positions – to expediently highlight the importance of regulatory constraint on municipal 
resilience. 
Section 2 describes the context and, in particular, the features of the two jurisdictions. Section 
3 details the methodology used to construct a budgetary position and volatility matrix and 
inter-temporal analysis of mean budgetary position and volatility over the period spanning 1 
July 2008 to 30 June 2014. The results of the analysis are presented in Section 4, with 
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particular emphasis on the effect of regulatory constraints on the financial resilience of four 
exemplar municipalities. The chapter ends with some observations on the importance of 
regulatory constraints for municipal resilience. 
Context 
Local government in Australia has a more limited remit than many of the other countries 
discussed in other chapters, focussing on providing roads, rubbish removal, development 
planning and health inspections, and maintaining parks and recreation facilities. In rural areas 
there is often a demand for local government to provide important services which may not be 
commercially viable – such as aged care, home and community care, child care and 
infrastructure to attract and retain medical practitioners. In contrast, metropolitan 
municipalities often play a complementary role in welfare (for instance, setting up homeless 
shelters or ‘safe’ drug injecting sites) and security (for example, setting up a system of video 
surveillance in entertainment precincts). Road maintenance is the single largest item of 
municipal expenditure – accounting for approximately a quarter of local government budgets 
(PwC, 2006). It should be noted that Australian municipalities are responsible for over 80% 
of the national road infrastructure (Chakrabarti, Kodikara and Pardo, 2002).  
The Australian Accounting Standards Board is the Commonwealth statutory body for 
prescribing accounting standards. Since 1 January 2005 all Australian entities have reported 
on a full accruals basis according to AASB equivalent International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). Local governments experienced difficulty setting up asset registers and 
have subsequently adopted inconsistent approaches to reporting depreciation accruals, which 
account for approximately a quarter of the quantum of expenditure (see, for instance, Drew 
and Dollery 2015b; Pilcher and Van de Zahn 2010; Pilcher, 2002). Auditing and assurance 
practices differ for the two jurisdictions, as do a number of other contextual features: 
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New South Wales Local Government 
The New South Wales local government sector comprises 152 general-purpose 
municipalities. In addition to the functions detailed above, many rural municipalities are also 
responsible for water and sewerage services (unlike their Victorian peers). The average 
population size of NSW municipalities in 2013 was 48,026, although individual 
municipalities had populations ranging from 1,180 to 317,598. Length of municipal roads 
maintained by individual municipalities ranged from 65 km to 3,982 km, with a state mean of 
1,090 km. In terms of fiscal responsibilities, the average operating expenditure in 2014 was 
A$39.07m (minimum A$7.3m, maximum A$266.4m).  
NSW municipalities are not recognised in the state or federal constitution and so they govern 
under delegated powers conferred via the Local Government Act (1993). The State Local 
Government Minister has virtually unlimited powers over NSW local government, including 
the ability to reconstitute boundaries and dismiss elected representatives. In the first decade 
of the millennium 23 municipalities were forcibly amalgamated, and NSW local government 
faces imminent amalgamation of approximately a quarter of the extant entities (Drew and 
Dollery, 2015c). Elections are held for representatives every four years with compulsory 
voting applying to all citizens. Municipalities have between 6 and 15 representatives, 
including the Mayor, who is directly elected in only 34 instances. Councillors elect the Mayor 
(who has both additional ceremonial and executive functions) for the other 118 municipalities 
on a one-year term. The General Manager of each council is appointed by the elected 
representatives on a maximum five-year term and the enabling legislation requires that the 
elected council be consulted on the appointment and dismissal of all senior staff (ILGRP, 
2013). There is no statutory requirement for municipalities to have an audit committee and 
only around one half of municipalities do so (Independent Local Government Review Panel 
(ILGRP), 2013).  
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NSW municipalities extract about 70% of their revenues through taxes and fees. Taxes are 
calculated on the unimproved value of land and increases to total taxation take are capped 
according to a single rate set for the entire state by the Independent Pricing and Regulatory 
Tribunal (IPART). This tax limitation regime has existed for almost four decades and has 
resulted in both uneven revenue effort across the state and significant budget constraints (see, 
Drew and Dollery 2015d). Intergovernmental grants are an important source of income for 
NSW municipalities. The bulk of the grants emanate from the Commonwealth Government 
but are allocated by state government grants commissions due to constitutional constraints 
(see Drew and Dollery 2015a). Grants may be tied to specific purposes or untied. The major 
untied grants are the Financial Assistance Grants (FAGs), which had a quantum of A$711.5m 
for NSW in 2015/16 (Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015). The 
Commonwealth Government has recently frozen FAGs for three years in order to help repair 
the federal budget deficits. 
Victorian Local Government 
The Victorian local government sector comprises 79 municipalities and had an average 
population size of 71,245 in 2013 (minimum 3,099, maximum 267,892). Thus, Victoria has 
fewer and larger (on average) local government entities than NSW. Length of municipal 
roads maintained by individual municipalities ranged from 42 km to 11,234 km, with a state 
mean of 1,659 km. In terms of fiscal responsibilities, the average expenditure in 2014 was 
A$91m (minimum A$9.55m, maximum A$364m).  
Victorian municipalities are recognised in the state constitution, although the Minister still 
has wide discretion, which has recently been employed to establish proscribed development 
application fees, performance monitoring metrics and contentious tax limitations starting in 
the 2016/17 financial year. In 1994 the state government forcibly reduced the number of 
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municipalities from 210 to just 78. The subsequent de-amalgamation of Delatite Council in 
2002, due to a sustained popular de-amalgamation campaign, increased the number of 
municipalities to 79. Elections are held for representatives every four years, with compulsory 
voting applying to all citizens (Drew and Dollery, 2015e). Owners of property who do not 
reside in the council area also have statutory voting rights, as do corporations occupying 
property (one representative of each corporation is entitled to vote in elections). 
Municipalities have between 5 and 12 representatives, including the Mayor, who is directly 
elected in only two instances. Councillors in the other 77 municipalities elect the Mayor for a 
one-year term (Economou, 2010). The General Manager of each council is the sole 
appointment made by the elected representatives. Victorian municipalities are centrally 
audited by the Victorian Auditor General’s Office (VAGO) and must all operate an audit 
committee according to section 139 of the Local Government Act (1989) (VAGO, 2015). 
Central auditing and compulsory audit committees do not currently apply in NSW local 
government. 
Victorian municipalities obtain about 63% of their revenues from taxes and fees. Taxes are 
calculated on the capital improved value of land and structures and the rate of taxation is 
currently determined by elected representatives of the municipalities (Drew and Dollery, 
2015d). Intergovernmental grants are also an important source of income for Victorian 
municipalities. FAGs for Victorian municipalities totalled A$539.8m in 2015/16 (Department 
of Infrastructure and Regional Development, 2015). Initial State FAG allocations are based 





The aim of this chapter is to examine municipal resilience with particular emphasis on the 
effect of regulatory constraint. To this end the budgetary position and volatility were assessed 
for the 231 municipalities making up the jurisdictions of NSW and Victoria. Normalised 
budget positions were calculated for each municipality by taking the operating result from 
audited financial statements and dividing same by total revenue for the period. This approach 
accords with regulatory monitoring practices in Victoria. However, in NSW the regulator 
excludes contributions for capital purposes in its comparative dataset. To ensure a consistent 
approach for the two jurisdictions, capital contributions were added onto operating results 
and total revenue for all NSW municipalities. The mean operating result was then calculated 
for each of the municipalities over the relevant period (the six financial years from 2009 to 
2014: publicly available data does not exist for periods prior to 2009
1
 and as such the analysis 
in this chapter is limited to the years immediately after the global financial crisis).  Near zero 
mean budgetary position was taken to be between –1 and +1%. To stratify municipalities 
according to volatility, we conducted Ward’s method cluster analysis on the entire cohort for 
the standard deviation of individual normalised budgets calculated over the six financial years 
(use of the entire cohort in a single cluster analysis is important as it allows for a comparison 
of relative volatility between the two jurisdictions). Cluster analysis is an empirical strategy 
for arranging municipalities into homogenous groups. Ward’s method joins municipalities to 
groups which result in the minimum increase to the error sum of squares as measured by 
Euclidian distance (for further information on cluster analysis see Drew and Dollery, 2014). 
We grouped the analysis into three clusters representing relatively low, medium and high 
volatilities. A budgetary position and volatility matrix was then constructed over the six 
financial years (see Table1).  
                                                 
1
 In Australia the financial year is taken from 1 July to 30 June. Therefore, the data encompasses the period 
from 1 July, 2008 through to 30 June 2014. 
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Table 1. Budgetary Position and Volatility of New South Wales and Victorian 
Municipalities (number of municipalities in each cell is presented as a percentage of the 




Negative Around zero Positive 
Low 17 NSW (7.4%) 
1 Victoria (0.4%) 
9 NSW (3.9%) 
3 Victoria (1.3%) 
100 NSW (43.3%) 
67 Victoria (29%) 
Medium 4 NSW (1.7%) 
0 Victoria (0%) 
2 NSW (0.9%) 
0 Victoria (0%) 
1 NSW (0.4%) 
2 Victoria (0.9%) 
High 6 NSW (2.6%) 
0 Victoria (0%) 
0 NSW (0%) 
0 Victoria (0%) 
13 NSW (5.7%) 
6 Victoria (2.6%) 
 
Notably, the majority of municipalities experiencing a mean negative budgetary position over 
the six years were located in NSW (27 out of the 28 ‘negative’ municipalities). It is also clear 
that the level of budget volatility was far higher for NSW municipalities than for their 
Victorian peers (19 of the 25 high-volatility municipalities were domiciled in NSW).  
These results seem to suggest that differences in regulatory approaches might have an 
important effect on municipal resilience. In order to investigate this matter further we plotted 
the mean normalised budget position and standard deviation for each jurisdiction to examine 
inter-temporal trends. We then conducted four case studies drawn from diametrically opposed 
cells of the budgetary matrix: two low-volatility, negative budgetary position municipalities 
(Central Darling (NSW) and Monash (Victoria)) and two positive high-volatility 
municipalities (Carrathool (NSW) and Loddon (Victoria)). The extreme positions of the 
matrix were selected rather than the most representative clusters under the assumption that 
regulatory effects were most likely to be seen first at the margins. This desire to emphasise 
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the effects of regulatory constraints on resilience was also reflected in the careful choice of 
exemplar councils. For instance, Central Darling Shire was selected as it is the sole example 
of Australian government financial failure and Carrathool was chosen because it achieved 
very different budgetary outcomes despite being faced with quite similar environmental 
constraints. Moreover, Monash was the sole example of a Victorian council with low-
volatility negative budgetary position, whilst Loddon provided a good example of the need 
for revenue flexibility in the face of catastrophic natural disasters. The case studies were 
based on artefacts taken from the local media and official documents (such as transcripts of 
public inquiries and council submissions to public consultations). 
Results  
To provide a comprehensive understanding of the effect of regulatory constraint on municipal 
resilience in the post GFC period we considered the matter from two complimentary 
perspectives. First, we conducted an inter-temporal comparison in order to establish whether 
there were in fact clear differences between the two jurisdictions and therefore provide an 
empirical basis for suggesting that the disparate regulatory environments might have a 
bearing on the budgetary positions of councils. We then conducted a close examination of 
four councils in order to understand how regulatory settings, in particular, influence 
municipal resilience. 
Inter-temporal Analysis of Jurisdiction Level Responses Post GFC 
Figure 2 illustrates inter-temporal trends in budget positions at a state jurisdiction level, as 
well as a measure of the spread of budget positions for each of the two jurisdictions over the 
(financial year) period 2009 to 2014 inclusive. In order to interpret Figure 2 it is important to 
be aware of events which occurred over this time. The first major disruption to council 
budgets occurred as a result of the Commonwealth Government’s response to the GFC. To 
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assist municipal cash flows the Commonwealth pre-paid part of the 2010 allocation of FAGs 
into the 2009 financial year (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). Later, in 
February 2009 the federal government partnered with local government to roll out over A$1 
billion of the fiscal stimulus program (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). 
At about the same time, Victorian municipalities were faced with infrastructure write-offs 
and increased demand for welfare assistance resulting from the February 2009 Black 
Saturday bushfires, which affected 78 communities, covered 400,000 hectares and killed 173 
residents (Country Fire Authority, 2015). Municipal natural disaster response explains why 
Victorian municipalities as a cohort had a steeper downward gradient in their mean budget 
position between the 2009 and 2010 financial years (see also, Institute of Public Works 
Engineering Australasia, 2014). 
Figure 2. Budgetary Position and Volatility of New South Wales and Victorian 











































The strategy of prepaying FAGs was then repeated for the 2012 financial year, wherein half 
of the FAG allocation for 2012/13 was paid a year early– this time in order for the federal 
government to attempt to manufacture a budget surplus for the subsequent financial year 
(Comrie, 2013). Moreover, NSW municipalities recognised A$384m in investment losses 
during 2009–2012, associated with collateralised debt obligations, capital protected and 
managed fund products (Department of Premier & Cabinet Division of Local Government 
(DLG), 2013). ‘Lehman Brothers, in particular, were active in the WA [Western Australia] 
and NSW markets’ (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 64). Victorian 
municipalities had little exposure to high-risk investment products due to more conservative 
investment regulatory guidelines issued by the state regulator.  
Notably, the NSW jurisdiction had higher rates of volatility over the entire domain. This is 
likely the result of the strict tax limitation regime which made it very difficult for 
municipalities to mitigate volatile expenditure demands with own-source revenue increases. 
The NSW jurisdiction also had lower average normalised budget positions for four of the six 
financial periods. Given that the remaining two periods were characterised by significant 
shocks to which only Victorian municipalities were exposed, this overall result may be taken 
to suggest that regulatory settings (in particular tax limitations and investment guidelines) are 
extremely important to municipal resilience. 
The responses of individual municipalities to the various budget disruptions over the 
(financial) period 2009 to 2014 inclusive led to two very different regulatory reactions. In the 
case of Victoria, relatively high increases to taxation rates, executed to arrest declining 
budgetary positions, led to the state opposition party running on an election platform which 
inter alia included introducing municipal tax limitations (proposing that tax increases would 
be capped at the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index). When the 
opposition party was elected in May 2014 they quickly introduced preparations to establish 
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tax limitations to commence in the 2015/16 financial year (however, in response to strident 
stakeholder objections, the introduction of tax limitations was deferred in early 2015 to the 
2016/17 financial year) (Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), 2015a). In addition, 
Victorian municipalities were hit with a one-off defined superannuation call in the order of an 
aggregate A$396m to meet unfunded defined superannuation liabilities (Municipal 
Association of Victoria (MAV), 2012). In contrast, NSW municipalities, which had suffered 
declining budgetary positions principally as a result of the longstanding tax limitation regime, 
came in for a different type of regulatory intervention. The NSW Government established an 
‘independent’ advisory panel which recommended a program of radical forced 
amalgamations (Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP), 2013).  
 
Individual Council Responses to Shocks 
Central Darling Shire in NSW (exhibiting a six-year average budgetary position of –2.22%) 
has had the most spectacular outcome arising from post-GFC budget disruptions, having been 
placed into financial Administration in December 2013 when it became clear that the 
municipality was no longer solvent. This period of Administration has since been extended to 
2020 following a public inquiry which identified a long history of failed regulatory 
interventions stretching back to January 2011 (Colley, 2014). It is the first instance of 
government financial failure in Australia. 
Elected representatives (councillors) were quick to cite inadequate levels of 
intergovernmental grants as the cause behind the liquidity crisis confronting the municipality 
(Drew and Campbell, 2016). It was argued by councillors that the high infrastructure burden 
coupled with a small population spread over a vast distance equivalent to one-fifth of the size 
of the United Kingdom meant that only increased intergovernmental grant transfers could 
ensure a sustainable municipality. In addition, councillors drew attention to the burden 
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created by an increasing obligation of municipal government to address market failure (such 
as the purchase and operation of the Wilcannia Post Office after the previous owners fell into 
receivership) (Drew and Campbell, 2016).  
However, the inquiry was scathing of what it perceived to be the ‘fatalistic attitude [of elected 
representatives] about the councils financial viability’ (Colley, 2014, p. 9) In particular, the 
Commissioner of the inquiry condemned ‘councillors [who] blamed, and continue to blame 
the Federal and State governments, including various government agencies for a failure to 
provide funding to bail the Council out of the financial crises’ (Colley, 2014, p. 9). The 
attitude of the council might indeed have been the result of an extreme sense of fatalism as 
concluded by the Commissioner. However, it is also a possibility that the events leading up to 
the Administration period may have been the result of brinkmanship. Rather than reducing 
services, councillors expanded some services and when it became apparent that the council 
was approaching insolvency wrote to their Member of Parliament demanding an immediate 
cash injection of $2 million and a review of the quantum of grant transfers to the Shire 
(Colley, 2014, pp. 28-31). The state government response seems to have taken the council by 
surprise: the shire did not get a cash injection and was forced into administration, however, it 
did receive an increase in its FAG allocations in the order of $800,000 per annum from 
2012/13 levels (Drew and Campbell, 2016). In any event, the conclusion of the public inquiry 
was that the liquidity crisis could only be addressed through deep and enduring cuts to 
municipal services. Moreover, the Commissioner determined that the current elected 
representatives did not have an adequate commitment to the recovery plan and therefore 
declared that the municipality would need to continue in Administration for a further six 
years (Colley, 2014).  
A number of interesting observations can be made regarding the municipal resilience of 
Central Darling Shire. In the first instance, it is clear that tax limitations imposed by 
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regulatory authorities exerted a direct influence on the coping capacity of elected 
representatives, essentially dictating a high level of dependency on intergovernmental grant 
transfers for revenue side approaches to resolving the liquidity problem. Second, the 
transcripts from the public inquiry suggest that a combination of municipal tax limitations 
along with a high level of grant transfers had resulted in a disconnect between resident 
demand for enhanced services and own-source revenue (Colley, 2014). Finally, it is clear that 
elected representatives of the municipality suffered from diminished anticipatory capacity: it 
appears from the transcripts of the inquiry that the councillors really did believe that the state 
government would bail the municipality out of the liquidity crisis. Moreover, councillors 
seemed unable to anticipate the outcome of the inquiry: following the release of the 
Commissioner’s recommendations the Mayor was cited as saying that he ‘was shocked to 
hear the suspension will stay’ and that the ‘councillors were ready to return to work, and even 
had plans underway for the Administrator to hand back control’ (Local Government Career, 
2014). 
In Victoria there was just one council with a negative budgetary position over the six 
financial years subsequent to the GFC – Monash (six-year average budgetary position of –
1.66%). In its submission to the Essential Services Commission (ESC) regarding the 
proposed tax limitation framework, the municipality boasted that it ‘has consistently kept 
rates as low as possible and has the lowest rates of all 79 Victorian municipalities’ and that it 
‘has proudly maintained the lowest rating status for several years’ (Monash City Council, 
2015). In one sense Monash Council appears to have a self-imposed tax limitation regime 
which has led to similar results to those experienced by some NSW municipalities – 
deteriorating budgetary positions over an extended period of time. However, unlike Central 
Darling, Monash Council was able to anticipate a looming crisis and was prepared and able to 
take actions on the expenditure side to mitigate poor budgetary outcomes. In January 2014, 
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Monash Council voted to sell its two aged-care facilities (housing 165 residents) to Royal 
Freemasons for A$21.8m. This sale was expected to save the council approximately A$1m 
per annum in subsidies for the facilities as well ‘several millions of dollars in capital works in 
the short term’ (Lake, 2015). It is important to note one very big difference between the two 
municipalities – Central Darling is a rural council situated 950 km west of Sydney, whilst 
Monash is a metropolitan council located just 25.8 km from Melbourne, the Victorian capital. 
Consequently, Monash had the advantage of being able to find commercial operators which 
could make a profit operating council assets, whereas Central Darling had only the option of 
closing facilities – the shire’s remote location makes many commercial operations simply not 
viable. Therefore, it is clear that Monash had significantly greater coping capacity by virtue 
of its geographical position, but also greater anticipatory awareness of the need to adapt and 
mitigate revenue side budgetary constraints. 
On the opposite side of the matrix are the two exemplar high volatility ‘positive’ 
municipalities. Carrathool (six-year mean normalised budgetary position of 19.77%), like 
Central Darling, is a rural NSW council located some distance west of Sydney (675 km) and 
thus faces similar environmental constraints. In the 2012 financial year (prior to the 
investigations of Central Darling) the two municipalities faced almost identical 
circumstances. For instance, Carrathool had a population of 2,668 with an average income of 
A$38,064 and a council operating expenditure of A$17m, whilst Central Darling had a 
population of 2,108 with an average per capita income of A$38,248 and an operating 
expenditure of A$16.3m (Office of Local Government (OLG), 2015). The big difference 
between the two NSW municipalities was on the revenue that each was able to extract by 
virtue of the tax limitation measures. Tax limitations were based on incremental increases on 
the extant tax rate charged in 1977 – therefore municipalities which had small differences in 
rate revenue in 1977 could conceivably end up with large differences owing to the 
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compounding effect of almost four decades (Abelson and Joyeux, 2015). Thus, as at 2012 
Carrathool was collecting well over four times the municipal taxes as was Central Darling 
Shire despite roughly comparable capacity of residents to pay (Office of Local Government, 
2015). It should be noted that municipalities have the option to apply for special rate 
variations (SRV) to increase municipal taxes above regulated annual increase levels. 
However, this process is expensive (owing to the regulatory requirements to demonstrate 
need and community support) and politically charged, and one to which few municipalities 
are prepared to commit (in 2012 just 13 municipalities applied for SRVs) (IPART, 2015). In 
short, Carrathool Council had greater coping capacity (through higher budget redundancies to 
buffer against shocks) than Central Darling Shire, almost entirely as a result of higher 
revenue take afforded under the tax limitation regime. This serendipitous situation wherein 
regulated tax revenues far exceeded need meant that the leadership team at Carrathool could 
afford to exhibit an attitude of contentment at the same time as their peers were confronted by 
insolvency. 
In Victoria, Loddon Shire (215 km NNW of Melbourne) has had a highly volatile but 
positive mean normalised budget outcome over the six financial years which stands in stark 
contrast to the position of Monash council which also had – at least legislatively – the 
flexibility to adjust taxation revenues to match need. Volatility in the results can be directly 
attributed to a number of natural disasters which occurred in the rural area: between 
September 2010 and January 2011, Loddon Shire experience three major flood events which 
destroyed an estimated A$42m of road and bridge infrastructure (Institute of Public Works 
Engineering Australasia (IPWEA), 2014). The municipality was able to access national 
disaster relief funding and execute the restoration works in the stipulated two-year time frame 
and A$8m under budget (IPWEA, 2014). Consistent with other rural municipalities in 
Australia, Loddon Shire has a number of facilities to meet demand associated with market 
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failure, including five kindergartens and an A$2.5m home-care service (ABC, 2015b). The 
council credits its solid budget outcomes to the careful control of costs and the flexibility to 
set rates at a level commensurate with demand (Loddon was not subject to municipal tax 
limitations as were the NSW municipalities). For instance, Loddon Shire increased rate 
revenue by 7% in 2012, 5% in 2013 and 5.9% in 2014. Yet over the same period NSW 
council tax limitations allowed for increases of only 2.8% in 2012, 3.6% in 2013 and 3.4% in 
2014
2
 (IPART, 2015). This comparison highlights the importance of municipal tax flexibility 
in allowing municipalities to respond to shocks and thus produce positive budget outcomes. 
Indeed, the Mayor of Loddon Shire has recognised that the introduction of similar tax 
limitations in Victoria would impose severe constraints on the municipal budget, noting that 
‘we are going to have to start a conversation with our community around what services we 
might be able to reduce’ (ABC, 2015b). Thus, Loddon Shire is exhibiting great anticipatory 
awareness regarding the effect of regulatory constraints on municipal resilience. However, 
the Mayor asserts that the plan will ultimately result in unsustainable municipalities because 
‘our residents do not want a cutback in Council services’ (ABC, 2015b). Thus, whilst the past 
behaviour of Loddon Shire might best be described as adaptive it appears that looming 
regulatory constraints are creating an atmosphere of fatalism.  
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Australia has been widely lauded as one of the few developed economies to have escaped 
recession subsequent to the GFC. However, some of the measures taken by the 
Commonwealth to provide fiscal stimulus in the wake of the economic shock appear to have 
resulted in significant budget disruption for municipalities. Moreover, local governments 
have been exposed to a number of other shocks arising from natural disasters, loss of 
investment principal associated with ‘risky’ financial products and extraordinary defined 
benefits superannuation calls.  
The financial resilience of individual municipalities seems to have been influenced, at least in 
part, by jurisdiction level constraints – in particular, investment guidelines and tax 
limitations. NSW municipalities were exposed to significant risk as a result of inadequate 
investment guidelines (at the state regulator level) and they produced highly volatile budget 
outcomes as a consequence of revenue constraints associated with the tax limitations. In 
contrast, Victorian municipalities had far lower budget volatility and produced higher mean 
budget positions despite catastrophic natural disasters and almost A$400m of unexpected 
superannuation calls. In fact, an examination of the financial resilience of all 231 local 
governments over the period 2009 to 2014 inclusive revealed that just one of the 28 negative 
budgetary position municipalities was domiciled in Victoria and 19 of the 25 high volatility 
municipalities were located in NSW. This is compelling evidence of the critical effect of 
regulatory policy on municipal financial resilience. 
The importance of regulatory settings for financial resilience was further illustrated through a 
comparison of two municipalities from each jurisdiction drawn from diametrically opposed 
positions on the budgetary position and volatility matrix. Specifically, we compared the two 
NSW local governments of Central Darling (a low volatility ‘negative’ municipality placed 
into almost seven years of Administration due to poor liquidity) and Carrathool (a high 
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volatility ‘positive’ council). Both municipalities operated in similar contexts and under 
comparable operating expenditures. However, the resilience of the respective municipalities 
was entirely disparate as a result of significant difference in revenue take, attributable to the 
long-standing tax limitation regime. Two illustrative Victorian cases were also examined in 
order to elucidate post-GFC municipal resilience. In the first case – Monash – significant 
revenue constraints were also in place (this time as a result of self-imposed tax limitations). 
However, the evidence suggests that the officials at Monash had a better understanding of 
their financial predicament than the officials at Central Darling and they have implemented a 
number of expenditure side measures (such as selling the two aged-care facilities) to mitigate 
the poor budgetary position. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Loddon Shire in Victoria 
was able to engineer a mean positive budgetary outcome through careful control of costs and 
exercising their flexibility to set taxes at a level commensurate with need.  
It might be noted that the absence of self-regulatory approaches to resilience, evident in our 
sample, may be due to the sampling approach used in this chapter: we specifically, sought out 
examples of extreme outcomes to highlight the effect of regulatory constraint which we 
argued are most likely to be first perceived at the margins. It is entirely possible that local 
governments in the better represented cells of the budgetary position matrix exhibited other 
resilience behaviours such as self-regulation. However, our approach has uncovered tentative 
evidence of a novel resilience behaviour – brinkmanship (Central Darling Shire). In nations 
such as Australia where an important source of revenue is provided by a system of 
intergovernmental transfers not governed by robust empirical methodology, there is an 
incentive for local governments to try to exploit these so-called soft budget constraints 
(Oates, 2005). As fiscal austerity starts to bight (in combination with exacerbating factors 
such as taxation limitations) it is entirely possible that we will soon observe new instances of 
municipalities failing to cut services despite falling revenues in the hope that they might 
 21 
 
receive a bailout (either directly or through changes to grant transfers) should the finances 
deteriorate to crisis point.  
Ironically, the Victorian Government is set to introduce a tax limitation regime which will 
largely bring to an end the revenue flexibility which allowed Victorian municipalities to 
produce superior budget outcomes over the post-GFC period. Meanwhile, the NSW 
Government is in the throes of a forced municipal amalgamation program, largely designed to 
arrest the decline of local government budget positions – a decline attributable in large part to 
the longstanding tax limitation regime (Abelson and Joyeux, 2015). 
In summary, this chapter has demonstrated that regulatory policy can exert a large influence 
on municipal budgetary position and volatility. In particular, tax limitations and lax 
investment guidelines can seriously diminish resilience. However, it is also true that 
representatives’ understandings of financial vulnerability and the willingness to exercise 
spending restraint can have important implications for individual municipalities, 
notwithstanding the aforementioned constraints. In addition, we have demonstrated the 
importance of geographical context on municipal resilience. Specifically, low population 
size, low population density and large distance from major conurbations provides both little 
opportunity to outsource service provision as well as high demand on local government to 
address market failure. Finally, our analysis suggests bleak futures for municipalities within 
the two jurisdictions as the first signs of fiscal austerity start to emerge through the three-year 
freeze to intergovernmental grants. In particular, the imminent introduction of tax limitations 
to Victoria is a matter of great concern. Moreover, the NSW regulatory authorities seem 
unwilling to confront the problems caused by the longstanding tax limitation regime and 
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